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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Indian gaming has enabled some California Indian tribes to rise from abject poverty and 
political disenfranchisement to being one of the most influential interest groups in the state with 
large tribal government offices and large per capita payments to tribal members.1 However, not 
all tribes have benefited equally from Indian gaming, with unemployment and government 
dependency still high on the reservations of many non-gaming tribes.2 As a result, many tribes 
are looking outside their existing reservations to identify ways to take advantage of all the 
benefits Indian gaming has created for other tribes.3 Proposition 48 would, for the first time in 
California, approve an agreement between an Indian tribe and the State that would permit the 
tribe to operate a casino off of the tribe’s existing reservation.4 
 
Indian gaming in California is regulated by a combination of federal and state laws. At 
the federal level, Indian gaming is governed by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).5 At 
the state level, California voters amended the California Constitution in 2000 to authorize Indian 
tribes to operate “Las Vegas-style” casinos featuring slot machines and house-banked card 
games6 on Indian reservations throughout the state.7 This amendment authorized the governor to 
negotiate compacts8 with tribes, subject to ratification by the Legislature, governing gaming 
                                                 
1 JAY MICHAEL & DAN WALTERS WITH DAN WEINTRAUB, THE THIRD HOUSE: LOBBYISTS, MONEY, AND 
POWER IN SACRAMENTO 57–59 (2001). 
2 Alison Owings, Op-Ed, The Ka-Ching Doesn't Ring for Everyone / Indian Casinos are Thriving but 
They Haven't Made Most Indians Wealthy, and They Can't Solve the Myriad Problems that Exist on 
Reservations, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 11, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/The-ka-ching-
doesn-t-ring-for-everyone-Indian-2618214.php.  
3 See Controversial Applications in Process, STAND UP FOR CAL.!, http://www.standupca.org/off-
reservation-gaming/contraversial-applications-in-process (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (listing dozens of 
proposals by tribes to acquire new land for economic development). 
4 Greg Lucas, State’s First Off-Reservation Tribal Casino Poised for OK, CAPITOL WEEKLY (June 24, 
2013), http://capitolweekly.net/states-first-reservation-tribal-casino-poised-ok/ (describing the impacts of 
the underlying statute that is subject to a referendum by Proposition 48). The tribe in this case though 
takes the position that the casino is not “off-reservation” because the tribe followed the “rule and letter of 
the law” in obtaining additional reservation land for its casino. Facts vs. Faction: The North Fork 
Rancheria Project – Fact Sheet, NORTH FORK RANCHERIA (Jan. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/files/NFR%20Project%20Fact%20vs%20Fiction%203_0312121.pdf.     
5 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721. See supra Part II. A. for more 
information on IGRA. 
6 House-banked game is defined in the California Penal Code and is distinguishable from a nonhouse-
banked game because the house occupies the role of the banker rather than players betting against each 
other. CAL. PENAL CODE § 330.11.; see also Sullivan v. Fox, 189 Cal. App. 3d 673, 678 (1987) (“Banking 
game has come to have a fixed and accepted meaning: the ‘house’ or ‘bank’ is a participant in the game, 
taking on all comers, paying all winners, and collecting from all losers.”). Blackjack and Baccarat are 
common examples of house-banked games and IGRA defines this type of game as class III gaming. 25 
U.S.C. § 2703(8).    
7 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2000, at 4–5, available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2000/primary/pdf/2000ballot1.pdf.   
8 A compact, or tribal-state gaming compact, is an intergovernmental agreement between a tribe and State 
governing the conduct of gaming activities. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
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operations at tribal casinos in 
accordance with federal 
law.9 California has 
negotiated and ratified 
compacts with seventy-one 
Indian tribes;10 as of 2014 
there are sixty casinos 
operated by fifty-eight tribes 
throughout the state.11 
 
Proposition 48 is a 
referendum on the 
Legislature’s ratification of a 
compact between the North 
Fork Rancheria of Mono 
Indians (the North Fork 
Tribe) and the State of 
California.12 The North Fork 
Tribe is a federally-
recognized Indian tribe with 
its original reservation and 
government headquarters 
located in North Fork, California.13 While this land is eligible for gaming,14 Proposition 48 
would authorize the North Fork Tribe to build and operate a casino in a more lucrative location 
off of Highway 99 near Madera, California, thirty-six miles away from its reservation.15 
Proposition 48 would also ratify a tribal-state gaming agreement with the Wiyot Tribe, which has 
                                                 
9 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 19(f). 
10 The North Fork and Wiyot Compacts are not included in this total. 
11 Ratified Tribal-State Gaming Compacts (New and Amended), CAL. GAMBLING CONTROL COMMISSION, 
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/?pageID=compacts (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
12 See Figure 1 for proposed location of the North Fork Casino in relation to other casinos and cities. 
Figure 1 courtesy of the November 2014 Voter Guide. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER 
INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, TUESDAY NOVEMBER 4, 2014, at 43, available 
at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf#page=74 [“NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER 
GUIDE”].   
13 Tribal Offices, NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS, 
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/page.cfm?pageID=55 (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). 
14 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION: TRUST ACQUISITION OF THE 305.49-ACRE 
MADERA SITE IN MADERA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, FOR THE NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS 
§ 2.1.3 (2012), available at http://www.northforkeis.com/documents/rod/ROD.pdf (explaining the 
original rancheria is technically eligible for gaming under IGRA but that the land is held in trust for 
individual tribal members rather than the tribe, the land is steep and remote, and there would be 
significant community opposition to building a casino there). 
15 Letter from Larry Echohawk, Assistant Sec’y – Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Edmund G. 
Brown, Jr., Governor, State of Cal. at 6 (Sept. 1, 2011). 
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agreed to abstain from pursuing gaming activities on its eighty-eight-acre reservation near the 
Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge in exchange for payments from the North Fork Tribe.16  
Influential elected officials and organizations are on both sides of Proposition 48.17 Proponents 
of Proposition 48 contend the North Fork Tribe followed a procedure provided in federal law to 
acquire the land and a casino will allow the North Fork Tribe to be self-sufficient and bring 
thousands of jobs to a region with high poverty and unemployment. Opponents argue that the 
North Fork Compact breaks promises that Indian tribes made in 2000 to limit gaming to existing 
reservations. Both proponents and opponents of Proposition 48 are financially supported by out-
of-state gaming interests whose genuine concerns for the welfare of Indian tribes, the California 
economy, and environmental impacts are questionable.18 
 
California law requires the governor to develop the substance of a tribal-state gaming 
compact, and thus the Legislature is precluded from amending the compact terms when it ratifies 
the compact with a statute. As a result, a statute ratifying a tribal-state gaming compact is 
distinguishable from other statutes. Should Proposition 48 fail, the North Fork Tribe will 
undoubtedly seek legal relief and argue that the North Fork Compact should not have been 
subject to a referendum.  
 
In addition to whether a compact can be the subject of a referendum, there are also other 
provisions in IGRA that could provide causes of action for the North Fork Tribe to secure a 
compact—and thus a lucrative casino—regardless of the outcome of Proposition 48.19 Some 
commentators have even suggested that in light of the Legislature’s authority to amend or repeal 
referendum statutes,20 rejecting Proposition 48 would simply result in the governor and the North 
Fork Tribe negotiating a new compact for the Legislature to ratify.21 However, this simple 
                                                 
16 TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE WIYOT TRIBE (2012), 
available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Wiyot_Compact.pdf [“WIYOT COMPACT”]. 
17 For a detailed list of the proponents and opponents of Proposition 48 see infra notes 149 and 175.  
18 The YES campaign is largely funded by Station Casinos LLC of Las Vegas and the NO campaign is 
largely supported by Wall Street banks with an interest in a casino that would compete with the North 
Fork Casino. Campaign Finance: YES On Prop. 48. – All Contributions Received, CAL. SECRETARY ST., 
http://cal-
access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1359411&session=2013&view=received (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014) (listing Station Casinos LLC as a major source of funding); Campaign Finance: 
NO On Prop. 48. – All Contributions Received, CAL. SECRETARY ST. http://cal-
access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1359207&session=2013&view=received (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014) (listing Brigade Capital Management, LLC and affiliated entities as major 
contributors). 
19 Infra Part IV. B, C (explaining two possible methods through IGRA that could provide for a valid 
compact).   
20 CAL. CONST. art. II § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes.”). 
21 See Omid Shabani & Daniel Reid, Proposition 94, 95, 96, 97: Referenda on Amendment to Indian 
Gaming Compact, CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2008) available at 
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Publications/2008ReferendaonAmendmenttoIndianGamingCompa
ct.pdf (contending that voter rejection of tribal-state gaming compacts in 2008 would send the tribes and 
State “back to the negotiating table”). However, while courts have not considered the issue in the context 
of a referendum, courts are cautious about allowing the Legislature to contradict the will of California 
voters. See In re Estate of Claeyssens, 161 Cal. App. 4th 465, 471 (2008) (repealing a legislatively-
103 
 
solution of ratifying a newly-negotiated compact in 2015 seems unlikely given the political 
consequences of reversing the will of California voters with a statute that barely passed in the 
Assembly by one vote and then only after reconsideration was granted.22 
 
Even if voters approve Proposition 48, the opponents of the North Fork Compact still 
have several opportunities to challenge the North Fork Casino.23 As a result, no matter what 
happens in November, Proposition 48 will likely not be the end of the story for the North Fork 
Tribe and its proposed casino. It will be just the latest chapter in California’s history of Indian 
gaming.  
 
II. THE LAW 
 
A. Brief History of Indian Gaming in California 
 
Modern Indian gaming in California has its roots in the early 1970s when the Rincon 
Band of Mission Indians adopted a tribal ordinance authorizing the establishment of a card room 
on the tribe’s 3500-acre reservation in eastern San Diego County.24 Fearing the reservation 
would become a “little Las Vegas,” San Diego County officials sued in federal court arguing that 
the card room violated the County’s gambling ordinance.25 The district court found that the 
County had jurisdiction over the reservation, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision on appeal in a 2-1 decision.26  
 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s other tribes in California opened small card rooms and 
bingo halls, including the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians in Riverside County. With local law 
enforcement and state officials looking for guidance on regulating these gaming operations, the 
Supreme Court defended the sovereign right of Indian tribes to govern themselves and the 
activities on their land in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside in 1986.27 The 
court held that local and state governments did not have jurisdiction to enforce their gambling 
laws on Indian reservations in California.28  
                                                                                                                                                             
enacted statute that conflicted with a voter-enacted statute and stating that “[a]ny doubts should be 
resolved in favor of the initiative and referendum power, and amendments that may conflict with the 
subject matter of initiative measures must be accomplished by popular vote, as opposed to legislatively 
enacted ordinance, where the original initiative does not provide otherwise”). 
22 Complete Bill History of AB 277, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014). Additionally, Senate President Pro Tem Elect Kevin de León is not likely to 
support another compact for the North Fork Tribe after urging Governor Brown to stop submitting 
compacts for off-reservation casinos to the Legislature until a proper policy could be developed. Letter 
from Kevin de León, Senator, Cal. State Senate, to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor, State of Cal. (July 
29, 2013).  
23 Infra Part IV. D (describing the ongoing legal challenges to the North Fork Compact). 
24 Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. San Diego Cnty., 324 F. Supp. 371, 373 (S.D. Cal. 1971) rev'd, 495 
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974). 
25 Id.  
26 Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. San Diego Cnty., 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing on a 
procedural error after finding the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case).  
27 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 




In response to the Cabazon decision, Congress passed IGRA in 1988 and created a 
framework for the regulation of Indian gaming throughout the United States.29 Under IGRA, 
tribes have a right to conduct gaming on Indian land30 to the extent permissible under state law 
and states have an obligation to negotiate compacts in good faith with Indian tribes governing the 
proposed gaming activities.31  
 
Following Congress’ enactment of IGRA, many California tribes operated gaming 
establishments largely unregulated for several years. California Governor Pete Wilson asserted 
the state’s interest to regulate gaming under IGRA in 1998 when he negotiated the first tribal-
state gaming compacts with several California Indian tribes.32 The compacts, known as the Pala 
Compacts, strongly favored state interests, but eleven tribes joined to support the compacts in 
exchange for the right to operate Las Vegas-style casinos in California.33   
Other California tribes opposed the Pala Compacts, claiming that the compacts infringed on 
tribal sovereignty34 due to the burdensome conditions imposed on tribes.35 These tribes collected 
signatures to place Proposition 5 on the ballot in November 1998 to establish a compact process 
more favorable to tribal interests than the Pala Compacts.  Accordingly, Proposition 5 sought to 
enact a statute allowing tribes to play a more active role in negotiating the terms of their 
compacts than under the Pala Compacts.36  
 
Proposition 5 was the most expensive initiative campaign ever at the time,37 which 
included well-funded opposition from Nevada casino corporations including the same Station 
Casinos involved in Proposition 48 in 2014.38 Voters passed Proposition 5,39 but the California 
                                                 
29 25 U.S.C. § 2702. 
30 Defined in IGRA section 2703(4) as: “(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and 
(B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or 
individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against 
alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.”  
31 Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1994) opinion 
amended on denial of reh’g, 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996). 
32 Aaron Peardon, Jackpot! A Legal History of Indian Gaming in California at 124 (May 2011) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas). 
33 Id. at 127.  
34 The concept of tribal sovereignty recognizes that Indian tribes are dependent sovereign nations, with 
distinct political communities, although they are under the “protection and dominion of the United 
States.” Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown, No. C074506, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 864, 
at *22 n.6 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Sept. 24, 2014).  
35 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1998, at 22–23, available 
at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf.  
36 See id. at 20–21. 
37 Michelle DeArmond, Indian Tribes Take Early Lead in Ballot Initiative Battle Over Tribal Casinos, 
LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 3, 1998, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/1998/nov/03/indian-tribes-take-early-
lead-in-ballot-initiative/. 
38 List of Contributions Received in Support of Proposition 5: Tribal-State Gaming Compacts, CAL. 
SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/bmgeneral98/prop5.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
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Supreme Court invalidated most of the statute holding that it conflicted with the California 
Constitution’s prohibition against “Las Vegas-style” casinos.40  
 
Following the court’s invalidation of Proposition 5, California voters amended the state’s 
constitution in March of 200041 through Proposition 1A.42 Amending the constitution addressed 
Proposition 5’s conflict with the constitution by creating an exception in the constitution itself 
allowing for Indian gaming.43 Proposition 1A also resulted in the approval of gaming compacts 
with fifty-seven tribes that the Legislature had ratified and governor negotiated, but which 
required the constitutional change to be effective.44  
 
The March 2000 ballot also contained a referendum on the eleven Pala Compacts, which 
the Legislature had ratified and compact opponents sought to reverse.45 While voters approved 
Proposition 29 53.1 percent to 46.9 percent,46 voters more strongly supported Proposition 1A 
64.5 percent to 35.5 percent.47 As a result, the eleven compacts approved by Proposition 29 were 
superfluous in light of the constitutional amendment in Proposition 1A and the compacts 
previously negotiated under the terms of Proposition 1A prevailed.48  
 
The years that followed saw a dramatic expansion of Indian gaming in California. In 
2008, voters supported the Legislature’s ratification of gaming compacts with four Indian tribes 
through the referendum process.49 The referenda allowed each tribe to significantly increase the 
number of slot machines at its casino.50 Today there are approximately 63,835 slot machines in 
                                                                                                                                                             
39 62.4 percent in support and 37.6 percent against. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE: 
GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 3, 1998, at 85, available at 
http://vote98.sos.ca.gov/Final/sov/SOV98.pdf. 
40 Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal. 4th 585, 615 (1999). The court found 
one portion, the portion waiving the state’s sovereign immunity, was still valid. See infra Part IV. C.   
41 Prior to the passage of SB 202 (Chapter 558, Statutes of 2011), referendum and initiatives could be 
presented to the voters at the primary or general election. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 
202, at 1 (Sept. 9, 2011). After July of 2011 referendum and initiatives can only be placed on the ballot 
for the general election. Id. at 2. 
42 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2000, at 4, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2000/primary/pdf/2000ballot1.pdf.   
43 Id. 
44 The fifty-seven tribes included the eleven tribes that also had signed the Pala Compacts. Id. 
45 Id. at 78.  
46 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION MARCH 7, 2000, at 161, 
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000-primary/sov-complete.pdf. 
47 Id. at 146.  
48 CAL. CONST. art. II § 10(b) (“If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the same election 
conflict, those of the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.”). 
49 Propositions 94, 95, 96, 97. The measures passed by near identical margins with Propositions 94 and 95 
getting 55.6 percent of the vote and propositions 96 and 97 getting 55.5 percent. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
STATEMENT OF THE VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION FEB. 5, 2008, at 62, 65 available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-primary/2008-sov.pdf. 
50 Propositions 96 and 97 allowed the Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation and Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians to increase from 2000 to up to 5000 machines and propositions 94 and 95 allowed the 
Pechanga Band of Luiseño Mission Indians and Morongo Band of Mission Indians to increase from 2000 
to up to 7500 slot machines. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 
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the state51 with the largest casino operating 4900 machines at Pechanga Resort & Casino in 
Temecula.52 
 
B. Factual Background of Proposition 48 
 
Proposition 48 seeks to reverse the Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork and Wiyot 
Compacts. Even before the North Fork Compact was subject to a referendum, the North Fork 
Tribe’s casino project near Madera was a lightning rod for controversy.  
 
The North Fork Tribe began its pursuit of a casino in 2004 with the announcement of a 
partnership with casino management corporation Station Casinos of Las Vegas.53 The tribe 
applied to the United States Department of the Interior to take the land near Madera into trust for 
gaming in 200554 and the Secretary of the Interior approved the application in September 2011 
through the two-part determination process authorized by IGRA.55 The two-part determination 
process in IGRA allows tribes to open a casino on land other than existing reservation land.56 
This was the first time a tribe in California had successfully completed this process.57 In 
September 2012, Governor Brown concurred with the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to 
permit a casino for the North Fork Tribe near Madera,58 as required by IGRA.59 
                                                                                                                                                             
SUPPLEMENTAL: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2008, at 12, 20, 28, 36, 
available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/feb/lang/english-sup.pdf.   
51 California Casinos, 500 NATIONS, http://500nations.com/California_Casinos.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 
2014).  
52 California’s Largest Indian Casinos, 500 NATIONS, 
http://500nations.com/California_Casinos_Largest.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
53 Project Overview, NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS, 
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/page.cfm?pageID=21 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).  
54 Trust land is land that the federal government holds title to for the benefit of an Indian tribe or 
individual, or which is held by an Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United States 
against alienation. 25 U.S.C. § 2201(4)(i). 
55 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Assistant Sec’y Echohawk Issues Four Decisions on Tribal 
Gaming Applications (Sept. 2, 2011). 
56 The two parts of the determination are: 1) the Department of the Interior determining that taking land 
into trust for a casino is in the best interest of the tribe and would not be detrimental to the surrounding 
community; 2) the governor concurring in that decision. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).  
57 The Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria received approval at the same time 
through the same process. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Assistant Sec’y Echohawk Issues 
Four Decisions on Tribal Gaming Applications (Sept. 2, 2011). This process is controversial because the 
governor unilaterally has the authority to concur with the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to permit 
Indian gaming on a proposed parcel of land. Briefing Report: Making Tribal Land Gaming-Eligible 
Through the ‘Two-Step Determination Process’, REPUBLICAN CAUCUS CAL. ST. SENATE, 
http://cssrc.us/content/briefing-report-making-tribal-land-gaming-eligible-through-two-step-
determination-process (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (“The most controversial aspect of the two-part 
determination process arises over the governor’s role in the concurrence.”). 
58 Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Concurs with U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior Decision, Signs Compact with North Fork Rancheria (Aug. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17700. 
59 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (requiring the governor of the state where the land is located to concur with 
the findings of the Secretary of the Interior). 
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At the same time Governor Brown announced his concurrence allowing the North Fork Tribe to 
build a casino near Madera, he also announced that he had signed a compact with the North Fork 
Tribe governing gaming activities at the proposed casino.60 Pursuant to the California 
Government Code,61 the Legislature ratified the North Fork Compact by passing AB 277 on June 
27, 2013 and Governor Brown signed the bill on July 3, 2013.62  
 
On October 22, 2013, the Secretary of the Interior published notice that the North Fork 
Compact had “tak[en] effect” in accordance with federal law.63 California Secretary of State 
Debra Bowen certified that a sufficient number of signatures had been submitted to qualify a 
referendum on AB 277 on November 20, 2013.64  
 
C. Existing Law and Proposition 48 
 
Proposition 48 is a referendum on the November 2014 ballot regarding Indian gaming 
compacts enacted by AB 277 (Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013).65 Proposition 48, and the 
underlying statute Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013, represents compacts ratified by the Legislature 
and negotiated by Governor Brown with the North Fork Tribe and Wiyot Tribe.66  
The Wiyot and North Fork Compacts are closely intertwined.67 The North Fork Tribe’s compact 
authorizes the tribe to offer class III68 gaming on land in Madera County outside of the North 
Fork Tribe’s existing reservation.69 The Wiyot Tribe’s compact prohibits the tribe from 
constructing and operating a casino on tribal land in environmentally sensitive areas near 
Humboldt Bay.70 In exchange, the Wiyot Tribe will receive between 2.5 and 3.5 percent of the 
                                                 
60 Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Concurs with U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior Decision, Signs Compact with North Fork Rancheria (Aug. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17700 (announcing both the concurrence to allow the federal 
government to take the land in Madera into trust and the signing of a compact with the North Fork Tribe). 
61CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.25(explicitly requiring that ratification be by statute). 
62 Complete Bill History of AB 277, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0251-
0300/ab_277_bill_20130703_history.html (last visited September 9, 2014).  
63 78 Fed. Reg. 62649 (Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-
22/pdf/2013-24350.pdf  (“This notice publishes the Class III Gaming Compact between the North Fork 
Rancheria of Mono Indians and the State of California taking effect.”).  
64 Press Release, Cal. Sec’y of State, Referendum Qualifies for November 2014 California Ballot (Nov. 
20, 2013) http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-releases/2013/db13-052.htm.  
65NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 40.  
66 Id.  
67 See id. at 41–42 (explaining the relationship between the Wiyot and North Fork Compacts).  
68 Defined in IGRA section 2703(8) as all forming of gaming that are not class I or II, but understood to 
mean house-banked games such as blackjack and slot machines. For more information on house-banked 
games see supra note 6. 
69 TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE NORTH FORK TRIBE at 
Preamble & § 1 (2012), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Final_Compact_--__North_Fork.pdf [“NORTH 
FORK COMPACT”].  
70 WIYOT COMPACT, supra note 16. 
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North Fork Tribe’s revenue from the North Fork Casino.71 The Wiyot Compact a twenty-year 
term that expires on December 31, 2033.72 
 
Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013, includes specified exemptions from the requirements of the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).73 However, the CEQA exemptions are limited to 
activities undertaken by the tribal government itself and do not extend to any intergovernmental 
agreements made with local governments for projects undertaken in support of tribal activities.74  
The North Fork Compact requires that the tribe complete a Tribal Environmental Impact Report 
studying the impact of a casino near Madera on environmental resources outside Indian land.75 
Thus, there will be an environmental review of the project, but a more limited review than would 
be required under CEQA.  
 
Under the terms of the North Fork Compact, the tribe is allowed to build and operate a 
casino in Madera County with up to 2000 slot machines and no other tribe can build a casino 
within sixty miles of this facility.76 The North Fork Tribe agreed to quarterly payments to the 
State Gaming Agency’s Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, which supports the activities of non-
gaming California Indian tribes.77 The North Fork Compact authorizes the tribe to make 
deductions from its revenue prior to making payments into the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund for 
reimbursement to the State for services provided, the tribe’s payment to the Wiyot Tribe, and 
mitigation payments to local agencies.78 
 
The North Fork Compact is extremely prescriptive, setting out explicit requirements for 
development and oversight of operations that encompasses state licensing, state inspections, 
dispute resolutions, compliance with state public health and safety law and regulations, and 
myriad other requirements.79 The term of the North Fork Compact is twenty years expiring on 
December 31, 2033.80 
 
D. Effects of the Referendum  
 
In the November 2014 General Election, California voters will decide whether the 
Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts should stand. A YES vote will 
affirm the compacts. A NO vote will reverse the Legislature’s ratification of the compacts.  
Referenda, by their very structure can be confusing to many voters, your authors included. 
However, voters who wish to affirm the compacts negotiated by Governor Brown and approved 
by the Legislature should vote YES. Those who want to reject the compacts should vote NO. In 
this paper we will refer to those groups who want voters to vote “No” and reject the compacts as 
                                                 
71 Id. § 4.1.  
72 Id. § 7.2. 
73 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.59 (b)(1)(A)–(F).  
74 Id. § 12012.59 (b)(1)–(b)(2).  
75 NORTH FORK COMPACT, supra note 69, at § 11.8.1.  
76 Id. § 4.7(b). 
77 Id. §§ 4.6, 5.1. For additional explanation of the fiscal impacts of Proposition 48 see infra Part V. C.  
78 Id. §§ 4.3, 5.7(a)–(h). 
79 Id. §§ 6–13.  
80 Id. § 14.2. 
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the opponents. Those groups that want voters to vote “Yes” and affirm the compacts will be 
referred to as the proponents.81  
 
III. DRAFTING ISSUES  
 
The language of Proposition 48 is not in dispute nor is it ambiguous. If passed, the 
referendum would affirm the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts as approved by the Legislature 
and Governor by AB 277 (Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013). If not approved, the referendum would 
overturn the ratification of the compacts.  
 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ISSUES 
 
The story of the North Fork Tribe and its proposed casino near Madera will not be over 
when polls close on November 4. The tribe will still have several options in court to obtain a 
compact if voters reject the compacts and Proposition 48 fails. First the tribe can argue that the 
statute ratifying the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts is not the proper subject of a referendum.82 
Second, Proposition 48 cannot annul the Secretary of the Interior publishing a valid compact in 
the Federal Register, which is all that IGRA requires.83  The North Fork Tribe can also argue that 
the State negotiated in bad faith so the Secretary of the Interior should impose a compact.84 
Finally, if Proposition 48 passes and voters approve the Legislature’s ratification of the 
compacts, the opponents of the North Fork Compact will have several causes of action as well.85  
 
A. Subjecting a Compact to a Referendum  
 
AB 277 is distinguishable from other statutes that are normally subject to a referendum 
because AB 277 is the ratification of an agreement between two sovereign governments rather 
than a statute subject to amendments, hearings, and voting in policy committees.86 The 
referendum process allows voters to affirm or reject statutes or parts of statutes enacted by the 
Legislature.87  
 
                                                 
81 This simplification is necessary as technically the groups on the “No” side of Proposition 48, such as 
Stand Up for California and the Chukchansi Tribe, were the supporters of subjecting AB 277 to a 
referendum and obtained the signatures to put the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts on the ballot. 
However, in order to avoid the confusion that would result if we were to refer to “No” side as the 
proponents and the “Yes” side as the opponents, we will refer to the “No” side as the opponents and the 
“Yes” side as the proponents.   
82 Infra Part IV.A. 
83 Infra Part IV.B. 
84 Infra Part IV.C. 
85 Infra Part IV.D. 
86 There are also implications with tribal sovereignty at issue here because the voters of California are 
dictating to a sovereign tribal government the terms of the activities on its land, but this discussion is 
outside the scope of this article. 
87 CAL. CONST. art. II § 9. 
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The question whether the North Fork Compact could properly be subject to a referendum 
was decided by the Madera County Superior Court in June 2014.88 The court held that 
ratification of the North Fork Compact was a legislative act properly subject to the referendum 
process.89 The North Fork Tribe has appealed the decision to the Fifth District Court of Appeal.90 
On appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the referendum power extends to statutes 
that merely ratify negotiated agreements.91  
 
While California voters’ initiative and referendum powers are expansive and protected by 
the California Constitution, the powers are still not unlimited. In American Federation of Labor 
v. Eu, the California Supreme Court held the voters’ initiative power is restricted to the adoption 
or rejection of laws.92 The court went on to explain that a law must be “declared by some 
authority possessing sovereign power over the subject.”93 The court found the voters lacked the 
authority through initiative to compel the Legislature to adopt a resolution urging Congress to 
submit a balanced budget amendment to the state.94  
 
Similarly, in People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court 
held that the voters’ initiative power did not extend to determining the process for the 
appointment of legislative leadership, how legislative committee assignments were made, and 
how legislative personnel were hired.95 Rather, the court found that the rules and resolutions 
enacted by voter initiative were outside the scope of permitted subject matter that the people 
could legislate through the initiative.96 The court concluded “[i]n sum, the people through the 
electorate have been given the power to make statutes, i.e. the power to make laws for all the 
people, but not the power to make rules for the selection of officers or rules of proceeding or 
rules which regulate the committees or employees of either or both houses of the Legislature.”97  
 
In contrast, in Legislature v. Eu, the California Supreme Court held that constitutional 
provisions adopted through an initiative imposing term limits on legislators and reducing 
legislative funding levels were valid.98 The statutes under review did “not affect either the 
structure or the foundational powers of the Legislature, which remains free to enact whatever 
                                                 
88 North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. California, No. MCV062850, (Madera Cnty. Super. Ct. June 
26, 2014) (ruling on demurrers to cross-complainant’s cross-complaint).  
89 Id. at 6–10. 
90 North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. California, No. MCV062850, (Madera Cnty. Super. Ct. Sept. 
4, 2014) (notice of appeal). 
91 Cases in other jurisdictions have held that a legislature’s approval of a compact is a legislative act 
because it is a policy decision that changes state law. See e.g., Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, 
999 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2008); Saratoga Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801 (2003).   
92 Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687 (1984). 
93 Id. at 711. 
94 Id. at 692.  
95 People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 316, 334 (Ct. App. 1986). 
96 Id at 326.  
97 Id.  
98 Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 535 (1991). 
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laws it deems appropriate.”99 In addition, the court found “[t]he challenged measure alters 
neither the content of those laws nor the process by which they are adopted.”100  
 
In the context of tribal-state gaming compacts, ratification takes the form of a traditional 
statute, yet the act taken by the Legislature is more like rule or resolution making. If the 
Government Code required a resolution rather than a statute to ratify a compact101 then it would 
be clear in light of the holding in People’s Advocate that voters lack the power to reverse the 
action of the Legislature by referendum. While ratification is simply a yes or no vote much like a 
resolution, the Legislature required ratification through a statute, suggesting that it intended a 
referendum to be possible. On its face, Proposition 48 does not change the internal structure of 
the Legislature and is essentially a measure that allows voters to reconsider a policy decision 
made by the Legislature through a statute. However, after carefully analyzing the meaning of 
ratification, the appellate court will need to consider whether ratification is more like compelling 
the Legislature to adopt a resolution and making rules for the Legislature, or more similar to a 
policy decision of a traditional statute.  
  
These arguments regarding whether the compact could be subject to a referendum are 
intertwined with other questions of federal law discussed below.102 As a result, these arguments 
will likely also surface in federal question litigation103 in federal court where the court may be 
less likely to follow California courts’ obligation to “jealously guard” the people’s right to a 
referendum under California law.104  
 
B. Effect of Publication of Compact in Federal Register 
 
If the referendum fails and the Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork Compact is 
reversed, the North Fork Tribe may file a lawsuit arguing that its compact is effective and valid 
because the Secretary of the Interior published the compact in the Federal Register. By this 
reasoning, Proposition 48 is a superfluous exercise because the compact was effective after it 
was negotiated by Governor Brown, approved by the Legislature, and published by the Secretary 
of the Interior in the Federal Register.  
 
IGRA specifies the procedure for a compact to be effective. Among other requirements 
not in contention here, IGRA permits class III gaming on Indian land if gaming is conducted in 
conformance with a tribal-state compact entered into by the tribe and state and approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior.105 A compact takes effect under IGRA “only when notice of approval 
by the Secretary [of the Interior] of such compact has been published by the Secretary [of the 
                                                 
99 Id at 292.  
100 Id. 
101 Or even if the Government Code was silent and the ratification process was ambiguous.  
102 Infra Part IV.B (questioning whether legislative approval and publication in the Federal Register 
finalized the compact).  
103 Federal question jurisdiction is ability of a federal court to hear a case because it involves a question of 
federal law. 
104 Rossi v. Brown, 9 Cal. 4th 688, 695 (1995). 
105 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). 
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Interior] in the Federal Register.”106 The North Fork Tribe’s argument would hinge when exactly 
a compact is entered into and effective.  
 
The argument that a compact is per se valid because the Secretary of the Interior 
published it in the Federal Register was rejected by the Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of Santa Ana v. 
Kelly (Pueblo).107 In that case, the tribe argued that the compacts were valid because the 
Secretary of the Interior published the compacts in the Federal Register even though the New 
Mexico Supreme Court had invalidated the compacts.108 Despite this argument, the court held 
that because the Governor of New Mexico did not have authority to validly “enter into” the 
compacts, the underlying compacts were invalid and the publication in the Federal Register did 
not cure the flaws.109 The court made clear that a valid compact is a two-step inquiry: “(1) the 
compacts must be validly ‘entered into’ under applicable state law and (2) they must be ‘in 
effect’ pursuant to Secretarial approval and notice.”110  
 
While Pueblo would seem to preclude the North Fork Tribe from arguing the validity of 
their compacts based on their publication in the Federal Register, the North Fork Tribe can argue 
its compact is distinguished from the Pueblo case. Unlike the compacts in Pueblo, there has been 
no determination from California’s Supreme Court that the North Fork Compact is invalid, and 
thus, the North Fork Tribe can argue that the compact was validly entered into pursuant to state 
law. The North Fork Compact was not void ab initio as the Pueblo compacts were.  
 
Also importantly, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen did not certify Proposition 
48 for the ballot until November 20, 2013,111 nearly a month after the North Fork Compact 
appeared in the Federal Register on October 22, 2013.112 The span of time in which the North 
Fork Compact was “in effect” before Proposition 48 qualified for the ballot makes a stronger 
argument that publication in the Federal Register was all the North Fork Tribe needed to make 
the compact effective.   
 
However, in fulfilling her duty to transmit the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts to the 
Department of the Interior, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen made the Department of 
the Interior aware of the possible referendum on the statute ratifying the compacts.113 Secretary 
of State Debra Bowen stated that California statutes, including Chapter 51 ratifying the 
                                                 
106 Id. at § 2710(d)(3)(B). 
107 Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997). 
108 Id. at 1548. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1553. These same two requirements are also provided in the North Fork Compact itself in section 
19.1, which states that the compact is not effective until it is ratified in accordance with state law and 
notice of approval is published in the Federal Register.    
111 Press Release, Cal. Sec’y of State, Referendum Qualifies for November 2014 California Ballot (Nov. 
20, 2013) http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-releases/2013/db13-052.htm.  
112 78 Fed. Reg. 62649 (Oct. 22, 2013) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-
22/pdf/2013-24350.pdf. 
113 Letter from Debra Bowen, Sec’y of State, State of Cal., to Paula Hart, Dir., Office of Indian Gaming 
(July 16, 2013). 
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compacts, did not become effective until January 1, 2014114 or if a referendum qualified, the day 
after the election.115 Consequently, the North Fork Tribe and the Department of the Interior had 
notice that the compacts did not necessarily go into effect after publication in Federal Register. 
 
As the court in Pueblo stated, IGRA “does not define what is necessary for a tribe and 
state to ‘enter[] into’ a compact,” rather state law determines the required procedure.116 The 
California Constitution provides that the governor negotiates compacts and the Legislature then 
ratifies them.117 Although the California Constitution is silent on the ratification procedures, the 
California Government Code provides that compacts “shall be ratified by statute” and goes on to 
describe that a majority is required in each house along with the governor’s signature.118 
As described above,119 the North Fork Compact was negotiated by Governor Brown and 
approved by a majority of both the Assembly and Senate before it was signed by Governor 
Brown and published in the Federal Register. The North Fork Tribe will argue that this process 
was faithfully followed and as a result the compact was validly “entered into” as required by 
IGRA. 
 
The opponents of Proposition 48 will argue that the compact was not validly “entered 
into” because the California Constitution allows for a referendum to reverse a statute passed by 
the Legislature.120 Article II, section 9, of the California Constitution defines the referendum 
power as “the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes except 
urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations 
for usual current expenses of the state.”121 As a result, the compact will not be validly “entered 
into” until the voters have decided whether to affirm the statute.122 
  
The opponents will point out that other compacts have been passed as urgency measures, 
which precludes the referendum process.123 If the Legislature had sought to similarly exempt the 
North Fork Compact, it could have done so by passing an urgency measure.  
 
                                                 
114 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 8(c) (Absent an urgency clause, “a statute enacted at a regular session shall go 
into effect on January 1 next following a 90-day period from the date of enactment of the statute . . . .”). 
115 Letter from Debra Bowen, Sec’y of State, State of Cal., to Paula Hart, Dir., Office of Indian Gaming 
(July 16, 2013). 
116 Pueblo, 104 F.3d at 1546.  
117 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 19(f). 
118 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.25(c).  
119 Supra, Part II. A.  
120 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 1 (“The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature . . . 
but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.”). 
121 CAL. CONST. art. II § 9.  
122 Id. at § 10(a) (stating that a statute subject to a referendum does not go into effect until the day after 
the election).  
123 Compacts with the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians and Pinoleville Pomo Nation were passed 
as urgency statutes. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.53 available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/asm/ab_3051-3100/ab_3072_bill_20080926_chaptered.pdf (noting that the statute is an urgency 
statute); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.551 available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-




Ultimately, the opponents will rely on the Tenth Circuit’s statement in Pueblo that the 
Secretary of Interior’s approval of a compact in the Federal Register “cannot, under [IGRA], 
vivify that which was never alive.”124 The court will have to decide if the referendum process 
can “un-ratify” a compact or whether the approval by the Legislature was sufficient ratification 
regardless of Proposition 48. 
 
C. An Alternative Compact Process Through IGRA 
 
If Proposition 48 fails and voters reverse the Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork 
Compact, the North Fork Tribe may seek to invoke a provision in IGRA that allows the 
Secretary of the Interior to impose a compact without ratification by the Legislature. IGRA 
provides two avenues for a tribe to obtain a compact authorizing class III gaming. First, the tribe 
may request the state negotiate a compact in good faith and the tribe and state may voluntarily 
enter into a compact governing gaming activities.125  
 
If the first method is unsuccessful,126 a tribe can sue the state seeking a determination that 
the state did not negotiate in good faith and compel the Secretary of the Interior to impose a 
compact.127 If a tribe obtains a declaration from a federal court that the state failed to negotiate in 
good faith, the court will order the state and the tribe to conclude a compact within sixty days.128  
Should the tribe and state not conclude a compact within sixty days, the tribe and state will each 
provide their last, best offer for a compact to a court-appointed mediator.129 The mediator will 
select a compact from the two options submitted, and the state will have sixty days to consent to 
the compact.130 If the state fails to consent, the Secretary of the Interior works with the tribe to 
impose gaming procedures consistent with the compact selected by the mediator.131 
 
As a preliminary matter, California waived its sovereign immunity, opening the state to a 
lawsuit arising from the state’s failure to conduct good faith negotiations with a tribe.132 Many 
states have not waived their sovereign immunity in suits related to compact negotiations, 
precluding tribes from seeking this remedy provided in IGRA.133 
 
                                                 
124 104 F.3d at 1557.   
125 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
126 Which would be the case if the voters reject the North Fork Compact. 
127 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). The purpose of this section in IGRA is to provide tribes an expeditious 
means to engage in class III gaming even if negotiations between the tribe and State break down. 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. State of Conn., 913 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990). 
128 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). 
129 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). 
130 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(v),(vi). 
131 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). 
132 Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal. 4th 585, 615 (1999) (striking down 
an initiative that authorized various forms of tribal gaming, but finding the waiver of sovereign immunity 
portion was separable and remained in effect).  
133 Gregory R. Mulkey, Texas v. United States: The Legality of the Secretarial Procedures Following 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 525, 525 (2009). 
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The state has the burden of showing that the negotiations were conducted in good 
faith,134 and if the court determines the state negotiated in good faith, the tribe’s proposal fails.135 
Only one tribe in California has ever obtained a declaration from a court that the state negotiated 
in bad faith.136 In that case, the court found bad faith after the state took a “hardline” approach to 
the negotiations and attempted to include provisions in the compact outside the scope of what 
IGRA permitted.137   
 
Before reaching the question of bad faith, the first hurdle for the North Fork Tribe is 
showing that the referendum is properly considered part of the negotiations.138 After all, the 
actual negotiation process in which Governor Brown and the North Fork Tribe bargained to 
identify the mutually agreeable terms of the North Fork Compact concluded in 2012.139 This is 
distinguishable from the Rincon case in which the governor was still conducting the negotiations 
so the court was able to immediately reach the question of good or bad faith. With the North 
Fork Tribe, it is the electorate acting in the place of the Legislature to ratify the compact 
negotiated by the governor.  
IGRA provides that the state must “negotiate . . . in good faith to enter into . . . a 
compact,”140 while California law creates the distinction between ratification and negotiation.141 
A court would need to find that IGRA’s broader directive of negotiating to enter into a compact 
includes the ratification, in which case the court can then consider the question of good or bad 
faith negotiations in the context of a referendum. 
If the court is willing to consider the referendum as part of the negotiations, the court 
must next determine that the negotiations over the North Fork Compact are within the scope 
permitted by IGRA and were conducted in good faith. IGRA provides factors for courts to 
                                                 
134 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(II). 
135 Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 2007). 
136 Staff, Rincon Band Becomes First California Tribe To Renegotiate Tribal-State Gaming Compact 
With Federal Courts, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/02/13/rincon-band-becomes-first-california-tribe-
renegotiate-tribal-state-gaming-compact; Rincon Band of Luiseño Mission Indians of Rincon Reservation 
v. Schwarzenegger (Rincon), 602 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010). 
137 Rincon, 602 F.3d at 1031, 1042.  
138 Some experts do not even consider this hurdle an obstacle and assume a state referendum is part of 
negotiations amounting to bad faith. See Marc Benjamin, Outcome of Proposition 48 May Have No 
Bearing on North Fork Casino Project, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 24, 2014, 
http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/10/24/4197065_outcome-of-proposition-48-may.html?rh=1 (quoting 
Michigan attorney Bryan Newland, a lawyer who worked for the Department of the Interior when the 
North Fork Tribe’s application for federal trust land was approved, stating that ultimate approval is with 
the Department of the Interior and the North Fork Tribe has a right to sue for bad faith because they have 
a right to negotiate for class III gaming).  
139 Defining the parties in this litigation will create an awkward circumstance for Governor Brown and the 
California government. On the one hand, Governor Brown negotiated the North Fork Compact so he 
presumably would be content to see it implemented. On the other hand, if the voters rejected the compact, 
the attorney general would still have an obligation to defend the voters’ ability under the referendum 
process to reverse legislation enacted by the Legislature. 
140 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
141 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 19(f). 
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consider when determining whether negotiations were conducted in good faith.142 Those factors 
include: “the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse economic 
impacts on existing gaming activities.”143  
If the court is considering whether voters rejecting Proposition 48 is bad faith, the 
opponents of the North Fork Compact should argue that the voters’ rejection was not bad faith 
because the voters rejected the compact for permissible reasons under IGRA. The opponents 
superficially included these reasons in the November 2014 Voter Guide but would have been 
able to make this argument much stronger if the voter guide had expressly stated that voters 
should reject the North Fork Compact because of adverse impacts to other casinos and public 
safety concerns. The opponents note the casino will bring crime and pollution to the Central 
Valley,144 but the arguments are largely focused on the expansion of Indian gaming off of 
existing reservations and other similar arguments.145 While these broad policy arguments could 
be considered the “public interest,” the connection is much more tangential—and thus a larger 
leap for a court to make—than explicitly stating specific criminal consequences and other public 
safety impacts. 
On the other side, the North Fork Tribe would need to show the exact opposite—that 
voters rejected the compacts for impermissible reasons. In Rincon, the court found bad faith 
because the taxes the state sought were outside the scope of the negotiations authorized by 
IGRA.146 However, the North Fork Tribe’s argument for bad faith is much less certain because 
notwithstanding the voter guide, there is no way to know why voters vote in a particular way. 
Moreover, the referendum is not part of the traditional negotiation process so there is no 
provision in the compact that the tribe can point the court to as constituting bad faith. Although 
the State backing out of a ratified agreement would seem to be bad faith,147 the possibility of a 
referendum undoing the ratification would not be a surprise to the North Fork Tribe considering 
referenda have occurred in the past.148   
                                                 
142 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(iii). 
143 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(iii)(I). 
144 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 46 (this is the only mention of crime in the entire 
argument against Proposition 48 and is contained in the quote from Madera County Supervisor Dave 
Rogers). 
145 Id. at 47 (The first line of the opponents’ argument against Proposition 48 states “Keep Indian gaming 
on tribal reservation land only.”). 
146 Rincon, 602 F.3d at 1033. The scope of permissible negotiations is delineated in IGRA and includes: 
(i) application of laws related to licensing class III gaming; (ii) enforcement of laws; (iii) reimbursal of 
the State for costs of regulating class III gaming; (iv) taxation by the tribe; (v) remedies for breach of 
contract; (vi) standards for operation and maintenance of the casino; and (vii) any subjects directly related 
to the operation of gaming activities.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(vii). 
147 Timm Herdt, What Prop. 48 Will and Won't Decide, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Oct. 22, 2014, 
http://www.contracostatimes.com/opinion/ci_26779849/timm-herdt-what-prop-48-will-and-wont (“The 
federal law requires states to negotiate tribal compacts in good faith; reneging on a signed compact would 
seem to be the definition of bad faith.”). 
148 Referenda on tribal-state gaming compacts have been on the ballot twice since 2000. Proposition 29 
(2000) (eleven Pala Compacts); Propositions 94, 95, 96, 97 (2008) (compacts with the Sycuan Band of 
the Kumeyaay Nation, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, Pechanga Band of Luiseño Mission 
Indians, and Morongo Band of Mission Indians).   
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Importantly, the burden is on the state to show good faith and not on the tribe to show 
bad faith.149 In Rincon, the state attempted to overcome its burden by arguing that the provisions 
in the compact providing revenue to the state general fund were not bad faith because they 
should be considered “other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming 
activities”150 and thus within the scope negotiation permitted by IGRA. The court rejected this 
argument and emphasized the limited nature of the negotiations.151 Accordingly, the state will 
rely heavily on the court considering the public interest as a factor in overcoming its burden of 
proving the negotiations were not bad faith. 
Ultimately, if the North Fork Tribe can overcome the question of whether the referendum 
is part of the negotiation process, the tribe has a compelling argument that the voters’ rejection 
was bad faith because it was outside the scope of IGRA. If Proposition 48 is rejected by voters 
and the North Fork Compact is not ratified, this litigation is likely to be a component of the 
proponents’ post-election legal strategy. 
D. Other Causes of Action 
 
If voters approve Proposition 48 and the Legislature’s ratification is not reversed, the 
opponents will still have multiple causes of action to challenge the North Fork Compact. 
However, these claims are all outside the scope of the validity of the referendum and speak more 
to the validity of the North Fork Compact itself and the procedure used for the taking the land for 
the proposed casino into trust. 
The following cases are noted below to demonstrate that the North Fork Casino is not 
finalized by the outcome of Proposition 48 as it will be months or years before these cases are 
resolved. 
Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians v. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Case No. 
C074506 in the California Third District Court of Appeal – on September 24, 2014 the 
appellate court issued its opinion and held that the governor is not a public agency under 
CEQA, so the governor was not required to complete an environmental impact report 
prior to his decision to transfer land to the federal government for the North Fork 
Casino. As of this writing, the decision is not finalized and the petitioner has not 
appealed.  
Stand Up For California! v. Dept. of the Interior, Case No. 1:12-cv-02039 in the D.C. 
District Court – alleging the decision by the Department of the Interior to take land into 
trust for a casino for the North Fork Tribe was arbitrary and capricious and violated the 
National Environmental Protection Act. 
Stand Up For California! v. Brown, Case No. F069302 in the California Fifth District 
Court of Appeal – alleging that Governor Brown violated the California Constitution’s 
                                                 
149 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(II). 
150 Rincon, 602 F.3d at 1033–34. 
151 Id.  
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separation-of-powers by making a policy decision to concur with the Department of the 
Interior’s decision to take the land into trust for the North Fork Casino.  
If the voters approve Proposition 48 and affirm the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts, 
these continuing legal challenges may still result in judicial invalidation of the compacts. These 
ongoing legal challenges demonstrate the intensity of the opposition to the compacts. Although 
the proponents may succeed if the voters affirm the compacts, the opponents may ultimately 
triumph if they can convince a court to overturn the compacts on other grounds.   
V. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES  
 
A. Supporters of the Compacts 
 
The proponents of this referendum, who support the compacts and urge a yes vote, argue 
that the compacts negotiated by Governor Brown and approved by the Legislature are 
advantageous to both the tribes and California.152 First, the construction and operation of a 
casino will create thousands of direct and indirect jobs.153 Second, the proponents contend that 
the casino will generate new state and local revenue. 154 Third, the proponents argue that 
approval of the compacts, in their current form, respects the concept of local control.155 Finally, 
the approval of the compacts will result in the protection of a scenic wildlife area.156 
 
The supporters of the compacts, who urge a yes vote on the referendum, assert that the 
construction and operation of the casino will result in thousands of new jobs including—
temporary construction jobs, long term operations jobs, and indirect jobs in the local 
community.157 The proponents note that “[t]he project will create over 4000 jobs as the result of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in private investment, boosting state and local economies.”158  
 
Robby Hunter, President of the California State Building and Construction Trades 
Council is quoted by the proponents in support of the project: “Voting YES guarantees good jobs 
for Californians and new economic opportunities for one of our state's poorest regions.”159 In 
addition, the Central California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce “support[s] the North Fork 
gaming compact to help bring jobs and business to Madera, Fresno, and the entire San Joaquin 
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Valley.”160 These statements demonstrate the broad support from diverse business and labor 
groups for the referendum and approval of the project.161 
 
Second, the supporters of the compacts assert that the construction and operation of a 
casino in Madera County will generate new revenue for both the state and local governments.162 
The supporters contend that “[v]oting YES provides crucial funding for public safety, schools, 
parks, roads and other public services.”163 Madera County Sheriff John Anderson states, that if 
passed, “[t]his project will fund local sheriff, police, fire, and other first responders.”164  
 
The Legislative Analyst’s Office states, that if approved, Madera County will receive a 
onetime payment of $6.9 million to $17.9 million and annual payments over the life of the 
compact of $3.8 million.165 The City of Madera, if the referendum is successful, will receive a 
onetime payment between $6.3 to $10.3 million and annual payments of $1.1 million once the 
casino is open for the term of the compact.166 The Madera Irrigation District will receive annual 
payments of $47,500 with a provision increasing that amount if water usage is higher than 
anticipated.167 In addition, the North Fork Tribe is required to make annual payments of $3.5 
million to other local governments for the life of the compact.168 
 
Third, the supporters argue that this project respects local control of economic 
development and urban planning.169 Tom Wheeler, Chairman of the Madera County Board of 
Supervisors, stated in support of Proposition 48: “Our region will benefit economically from this 
project. We can’t allow New York hedge-fund operators with financial ties to a competing 
casino to determine our economic future. Vote YES to protect local control.”170 The supporters 
make this claim based on the Chukchansi Tribe’s partnership with Brigade Capital—an out-of-
state hedge fund operator and investment advisor with offices in New York City and Zurich, 
Switzerland.171  
 
However, while local control is an argument used by proponents because the North Fork 
Tribe and local governments negotiated agreements related to the casino, Stations Casinos LLC 
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of Las Vegas has been a major contributor to the Yes on Proposition 48 campaign.172 The casino 
corporation has an agreement to manage the North Fork Casino and stands to profit significantly 
if the casino is approved. The contributors to the Yes on Proposition 48 campaign also include 
the statewide Democratic Central Committee.173 
 
Fourth, the supporters of the compacts assert that voting yes of Proposition 48 will result 
in the protection of scenic wildlife areas. The supporters state “[a] YES vote avoids potential 
casino construction in the Sierra foothills near Yosemite and near the Humboldt Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge.”174 Dan Cunning, representing the Yosemite Sierra Visitors Bureau, argues, 
“[a] yes vote on Proposition 48 protects two of California’s most environmentally precious 
areas.”175 The State expressed concern about the negative environmental impact upon the 
Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge if the Wiyot Tribe were to build on land the tribe owns 
near the refuge.176 These concerns were significant enough that the State included a provision in 
the Wiyot Compact prohibiting the Wiyot Tribe from building a casino near the refuge in 
exchange for 2.5 to 3.5 percent of the annual slot machine net revenue from the North Fork 
Tribe’s casino.177 
 
The supporters of the compacts contend that voters who wish to create thousands of jobs 
in the Central Valley, generate state and local revenue for governments in Madera County, 
protect local control of development, or protect scenic wildlife areas should vote yes on 
Proposition 48 and allow the Legislature’s approval of the compacts to stand.  
 
B. Opponents of the Compacts  
 
The opponents of Proposition 48 urge the voters to overturn the ratification of the 
compacts for three fundamental reasons.178 First, the compacts set a precedent that could result in 
a massive increase in off-reservation gambling while breaking the tribes’ promise in 2000 to 
limit Indian gaming to existing tribal land.179 Second, the North Fork Compact will result in 
more pollution and negative social impacts in the Central Valley.180 Finally, the North Fork 
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Compact will not result in new money being given by the tribe to the state general fund or 
schools.181 
 
The opponents of the compacts assert that the approval of this compact will set a 
precedent of tribes “reservation shopping,” where rural tribes in remote areas will seek to have 
urban land, far from their historic reservations, taken into trust to build and operate new 
casinos.182 The opponents state that Proposition 48, if passed, would “allow the North Fork Tribe 
to build an off-reservation, Vegas-style 2,000 slot machine casino more than an hour’s drive 
from the tribe’s established reservation land, closer to major freeways and Central Valley 
communities.”183 In addition, several major newspapers have editorialized that these compacts 
will result in a massive shift in California’s Indian gaming policy that will likely result in the 
growth of Indian gaming outside of traditional, recognized, Indian land.184  
 
Additionally, the opponents of the compacts argue that when voters originally approved 
Indian gaming in 2000, it was with the understanding that such gaming was limited to existing 
Indian land and the approval of off-reservation casinos such as the North Fork Tribe’s breaks 
that understanding.185 “Years ago, California Indian Tribes asked voters to approve limited 
casino gaming on Indian reservation land. They promised Indian casinos would ONLY be 
located on the tribes’ original reservation land.”186 In addition, “[w]hile most tribes played by the 
rules, building on their original reservation land and respecting the voters’ wishes, other tribes 
are looking to break these rules and build casino projects in urban areas across California.”187 
Therefore, voters who want to continue the original, voter-approved policy of allowing tribes to 
build and operate casinos on their traditional, rural reservations and take a position against 
expansion into urban, more densely populated areas, should vote no on Proposition 48.188 
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The opponents of the compacts also argue that approving the compact and allowing the 
North Fork Tribe to develop a casino and resort near Madera will result in negative social and 
environment impacts in Madera County.189 Opponents also argue that Proposition 48 is “opposed 
by Central Valley businesses, farmers, and community leaders because it means MORE air 
pollution, MORE traffic, and the loss of open space.”190 In addition, the operation of a casino 
and resort in this location will create a “greater burden on an already limited water supply.”191 
The opponents argue that voters who value the current environmental quality of Madera County, 
the larger Central Valley, and ultimately California, should vote no on Proposition 48.  
 
Finally, the opponents of Proposition 48 contend that the Wiyot and North Fork 
Compacts fail to increase revenue for the general fund and schools.192 The opponents note that 
“[u]nlike prior Indian gaming compacts this deal provides NO money for California’s schools 
and NO additional money for our state general fund.”193 Therefore, voters who believe that 
former compacts requiring tribes to pay a percentage of their gaming revenue to the general fund 
and schools was an advantageous policy should vote no on Proposition 48.  
 
While “reservation shopping” and social impacts are concerns expressly listed by 
opponents of Proposition 48 in the voter guide, the identity of the major financial backers of the 
No on Proposition 48 campaign suggests other motives. The financial backers of the No on 
Proposition 48 include the Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (Chukchansi Tribe) and 
the Table Mountain Rancheria, which both operate casinos whose revenue would be significantly 
impacted by a new casino in the region.194 The financial backers also include hedge fund 
manager Brigade Capital, which is the financial backer of the Chukchansi Tribe’s casino.195 This 
list of supporters suggests that the actual financial backers of the campaign are more concerned 
with protecting their own investments than the concerns expressed in the voter guide.  
 
The opponents of the compacts contend that voters who are concerned about the potential 
spread of Indian gaming beyond traditional reservations into populated urban areas, the 
environmental quality in Madera County and the Central Valley, or the lack of revenue to the 
state should vote no on the referendum and reject the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts.  
 
C. Fiscal Impact of Proposition 48  
 
The economic benefits to the State of California of a casino and resort in Madera County 
are uncertain.196 According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office, the economic impact will depend 
on several factors including the size and type of casino constructed, the extent to which the 
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casino impacts the revenue of other tribal and nontribal revenue generating activities, and the 
manner in which payments to state and local governments are implemented.197  
 
Although the North Folk Tribe is required to make payments to the State, these payments 
are compensation for the State’s expenditures related to regulatory monitoring and transportation 
improvements.198 While opponents compare the North Fork Compact to previous compacts 
providing for payments to the state general fund,199 the absence of payments to the state general 
fund is consistent with IGRA, which only authorizes payments to the state for direct 
reimbursement of expenses incurred by the state.200  
 
The lack of payment to the state general fund is also consistent with the federal policy 
that Indian casinos are for the economic development of the tribes, their self-sufficiency, and 
strengthening of tribal governments rather than as a revenue stream for a state.201 According to 
the Legislative Analyst’s, any changes in revenue for the state will come at the expense of other 
gambling enterprises and from a shift in other forms of discretionary spending.202 
 
The direct economic impact upon local governments is clear—there will be large onetime 
payments in the first year the casino is in operation followed by much smaller annual payments 
for the life of the North Fork Compact.203 Madera County as well as the City of Madera will 
receive onetime payments between $16 million and $35 million in compensation for services to 
the casino once the casino is in operation.204 In addition, the compact will result in Madera 
County, the City of Madera, and the Madera Irrigation District receiving about $3.5 million a 
year for the duration of the compact.205 Also, both the state and the local governments will 
experience a decrease in direct tax revenue as tribal land is not subject to state and local taxes.206 
However, the Legislative Analyst’s Office classifies this loss of revenue as “not significant.”207  
 
There will also be an increase in economic activity in the region, and commensurate 
increase in local and state tax revenue, as more people come into Madera County and spend 
money on goods and services.208 Indian casinos generally stimulate local economies and a 
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Madera casino will likely do so as well.209 However, this increased activity will most likely be 
redirected from other surrounding counties rather than be truly new revenue.210  
 
The economic benefit of this compact for the North Fork Tribe is unknown, but is likely 
significant. However, any revenue generated by the North Fork Tribe comes at the direct expense 
of the Chukchansi Tribe and their Chukchansi Gold Resort & Casino in the mountains above 
Highway 99.211 The Chukchansi Tribe estimates a 40 percent loss in revenue from the North 
Fork Tribe’s casino in Madera County, which will purportedly result in the closing of the 
Chukchansi Gold Resort & Casino.212 Chairman Reggie Lewis of the Chukchansi Tribe 
describes the impact as a “devastating economic blow to my people from which I do not know 




To its opponents, Proposition 48 represents much more than one casino, for one tribe, in 
the Central Valley—it represents whether California voters are willing to allow an expansion of 
Indian gaming off of existing reservations and closer to urban areas. To the North Fork Tribe and 
those most closely tied to the success of the tribe’s casino near Madera, Proposition 48 represents 
an opportunity to join other tribes in the state as wealthy and influential political entities.  
 
Regardless of the outcome in November, litigation is sure to follow. If voters reject 
Proposition 48, the North Fork Tribe is sure to contend that the compacts should never have been 
subject to the referendum process, and if Proposition 48 passes, opponents are sure to claim that 
Governor Brown never had the authority to approve the land transfer for the North Fork Tribe.     
 
For voters on the outside looking in though, it is important to put the measure into its 
proper context. The Fresno Bee succinctly frames the issue: “There are no angels in this fight. A 
Las Vegas casino corporation wants to expand, while a New York hedge fund wants to protect 
its investment. Some tribes would benefit, and others might lose.”214 It is up to the voters to 
determine who those winners and losers will be.  
 
                                                 
209 See Amy Quinton, Study Shows California Tribal Gaming Casinos Have Big Economic Impact, KPBS 
(Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2012/aug/08/study-shows-california-tribal-gaming-casinos-
have-/ (describing the overall economic impact of tribal casinos on communities). 
210 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 45. 
211 Letter from Reggie Lewis, Chairman, Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians, to Cal. 
Legislators (May 2, 2013). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Editorial, Vote ‘No’ on Prop. 48 — Stop Highway 99 Casino, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 6, 2014 
http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/09/06/4108812/our-viewvote-no-on-prop-48-stop.html#storylink=cpy.  
